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Twenty years after the promulgation of the experi-mental “Organic Law on Village Committees”, theimplementation of Chinese village elections and
their impact on rural governance has lost, as it seems, quite
a bit of the attention it formerly generated among scholars
both in the PRC and abroad. One reason for this observa-
tion is disappointment: Although the direct ballot promised
the institutionalisation of more transparency, accountability
and democratic awareness in China’s villages, regarded as
necessary prerequisites for the gradual extension of elections
to higher administrative levels in the near future, this initial
optimism has hardly been translated into reality. Today, elec-
tions are fairly well entrenched in China’s vast countryside.
Moreover, many scholars have stated—albeit cautiously—that
at least in those places where elections are conducted regu-
larly and in accordance with the stipulations of the Organic
Law, which was promulgated and made effective nationwide
in 1998, they have become a meaningful part of village life
by elevating peasants’ political efficacy, giving them more in-
fluence on village politics and helping to restore strained
cadre-peasant relations.((1) However, all local efforts to push
direct elections to the township level have so far failed, as
the central government has made it repeatedly clear that
such a move—though part of the long-term agenda—is not to
become official policy in the foreseeable future.((2) At the
same time, reports on village riots caused by local cadre cor-
ruption and misconduct have strikingly increased in number
over the last years. In many parts of China, illegal land ac-
quisitions—paired with the unlawful or absent financial com-
pensation of peasants, generating windfall profits for greedy
local officials—have constituted the main impetus for rural
upheaval and outright violence. In these places, direct elec-
tions have proved an inefficient means to rein in powerful
cadres, and often enough they have heightened political ten-
sions by inducing peasants to use their democratic rights
against law-breaking and corrupt local officials.((3) Conse-
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1. However, village elections have also resulted in elevated tension in rural China as peas-
ants came to understand their democratic rights and more vigorously resist cadre author-
ity. See He, Baogang and Lang, Youxing, “Cunmin xuanju dui xiangcun quanlide yingxiang
(The influence of village elections on rural power),” Xianggang shehui kexue xuebao (Hong
Kong Journal of Social Sciences), n° 16, 2000, pp. 99-124; Li, Fan (ed), Zhongguo jiceng
minzhu fazhan baogao, 2000-2001 (Report on the development on China’s grassroots
democracy, 2000-2001), Beijing, 2002; Wu, Chongqing and He, Xuefeng, Zhixuan yu zizhi
(Direct elections and self-government), Guangzhou, Yangcheng wanbao, 2003; Li,
Lianjiang, “The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China,” Asian Survey, n° 4, 2003,
pp. 648-62; Kennedy, John James, Rozelle, Scott and Shi, Yaojiang, “Elected Leaders and
Collective Land: Farmer’s Evaluation of Village Leaders’ Performance in Rural China,”
Journal of Chinese Political Science, n° 1, 2004, pp. 1-22; Chen, Jie, “Popular Support for
Village Self-government in China,” Asian Survey, n° 6, 2005, pp. 865-85.
2. There have been a few experiments with direct township elections, though. See Li, Fan,
Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao, op. cit.; Huang, Weiping and Shubin, Zhou,
Xiangzhenzhang xuanju fangshi gaige: anli yanjiu (Case studies on the reform methods con-
cerning the election of township chiefs), Beijing, Shehui kexue wenjian, 2003; Schubert,
Gunter, “Democracy under One-party Rule,” China Perspectives, n° 46, 2003, pp. 15-25; Li,
Fan (ed), Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao 2004 (Report on the development of
China’s grassroots democracy, 2004), Beijing, Zhishi chanquan, 2005; Liu, Hairong, “Semi-
Competitive Elections at Township Level in Sichuan Province,” China Perspectives, n° 51,
2004, pp. 13-27, and Li, Lianjiang, “Direct Township Elections,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and
Merle Goldman, Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 2007, pp. 97-116. Still, in many places the local cadres are not interested
in expanding direct elections, as they are afraid of loosing control over local politics and of
the instability caused by politically mobilized peasants—similar to the situation twenty
years ago as the implementation of direct village elections was hotly debated.
3. The case of Taishi village (太石村), located near Guangzhou in southern Guangdong
province, became most notorious in this respect. In July 2005, peasants tried to legally
petition for the dismissal of their village head whom they accused of corruption, caus-
ing a violent confrontation with township authorities that persisted for months and cap-
tured much international attention.
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This article discusses the impact of direct village elections on regime legitimacy in China’s local government.
Applying a model based on David Easton’s political systems theory, it is argued that village elections in Lishu county,
Jilin province, have contributed significantly to increased social stability and the quality of local governance,
resulting in more regime legitimacy. “Rational trust” on the part of the peasants in their cadres may best explain the
observation that the cadres’ political supremacy has not been challenged by direct elections.
quently, those scholars who continually observe and research
political developments in China’s vast countryside have
turned their focus to the dynamics of peasant protest and
how what Li Lianjiang and Kevin O’Brien once termed
“policy-based” or “rightful resistance” may be seen as cur-
rently evolving into new and more proactive forms of resist-
ance and peasant organisation.((4) This change in focus
squares with the impression that village elections have failed
as a means to enhance the quality of local self-government—
the Communist Party’s major objective in implementing
them. Finally, the significance of village elections seems to
be downgraded by China’s ongoing fiscal and administrative
reforms.((5) As townships and villages are increasingly de-
prived of opportunities to generate income for the sake of
strengthening central control over rural debts and illegal off-
budget revenues, and counties gain in allocation and policy-
making power, village committees are in danger of being
gradually transformed into local service centres of county
governments. With nothing to distribute and nothing to de-
cide upon in terms of economic and political strategy, village
elections would then be meaningless.
However, this pessimistic outlook may be somewhat prema-
ture, as we can only now begin to discern the contours of a
new fiscal regime currently being built in rural China. At
this point in the debate on rural governance reforms, it is
more interesting to note that village elections have never
been systematically assessed with respect to their factual im-
pact on stability and regime legitimacy in the local state. To
achieve both of these goals has been the major motivation
behind the central government’s decision to promote the di-
rect ballot in the countryside, besides pushing for economic
development and putting more capable cadres in place.
Only with officials more attuned to the local populace out of
fear of being voted out of office, so it was assumed, could
social stability, economic development and harmonious
peasant-cadre relations in rural China be secured and made
sustainable. Village elections, therefore, were assigned the
task of ensuring better local governance to serve the well-
being of the peasants, to enhance the quality of local cadres
and to reinvigorate the regime’s political legitimacy at the
grassroots level.((6) In this study, therefore, we hypothesise on
the capacity of village elections to produce stability and
regime legitimacy by drawing on a set of qualitative data col-
lected as part of a comprehensive research project on peas-
ant participation and political awareness in six villages and
six urban neighbourhoods. More precisely, we look at the fa-
mous county of Lishu in China’s north-eastern Jilin
province, where fieldwork was conducted in two villages be-
longing to the township also named Lishu in the summer of
2004.((7) We argue that direct elections in Lishu have pro-
duced a high degree of peasant political awareness (mea-
sured in terms of political knowledge, efficacy and participa-
tion), resulting in greater political support for and legitimacy
of the Communist Party regime as it is perceived in the local
state. 
Designated a model county—or demonstration (shifan)
area—by the Chinese government for its successful imple-
mentation of direct village elections from a very early date,
Lishu is certainly a success story for the regime. The county
has been widely reported in the foreign media and visited by
numerous observers of international agencies concerned
with the promotion of democratic elections in non-demo-
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4. O’Brien, Kevin and Li, Lianjiang, “Popular Contention and its Impact in Rural China,”
Comparative Political Studies, n° 3, 2005, pp. 235-59; O’Brien, Kevin and Li, Lianjiang,
Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge/Mass., Cambridge University Press,
2006; Yu, Jianrong, “Dangdai Zhongguo nongmin weiquan zuzhi de fayu yu
chengzhang” (Growth and Development of Peasant Assistance Organisations in
Contemporary China), Zhongguo nongcun guancha, n° 2, 2005, pp. 57-71; Yu, Jianrong,
“Social Conflict in Rural China Today: observations and analysis on farmers’ struggles
so safeguard the rights,” Social Sciences in China, n° 3, 2005, pp. 125-36.
5. See Kennedy, John James, “The Implementation of Village Elections and Tax-for-Fee
Reform in Rural Northwest China,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, Grassroots
Political Reform in Contemporary China, Cambridge/Mass., Harvard University Press,
2007, pp. 48-74, who also discusses the relationship between village elections and the
fiscal reforms implemented over the last years.
6. O’Brien, Kevin J., “Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages,” The Australian
Journal of Chinese Affairs, n° 32, 1994, pp. 33-59; O’Brien, Kevin J. and Li, Lianjiang,
“Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party-State: Introducing Village Elections in
China,” China Quarterly, n° 162, 2000, pp. 465-89.
7. For details see appendices 1 and 2.
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cratic countries. For these reasons, Lishu county may be de-
clared an invalid empirical case to test the success of election-
driven legitimacy-building in rural China. However, Lishu
was not a site that was officially pre-selected for the imple-
mentation of direct village elections from above. It gained its
reputation only after the efficacious conclusion of some
rounds of competitive elections as well as the successful insti-
tutionalisation of so-called haixuan((8) nominations for elec-
toral candidates by reform-minded local officials (see below).
Only then did Lishu come to the attention of the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, which is responsible for the nationwide imple-
mentation of the Organic Law, and was declared a model
that other local governments should emulate. The contention
that Lishu does well today because the government has had
its eye on it can therefore not explain the whole story. 
Certainly, the villages of Lishu county do not permit general-
isations concerning the relative success of direct elections in
rural China. However, the same may be true for those places
where these elections have seen mixed results or failed, given
the limited number of localities that have been investigated so
far by scholars and the media. Taking into account the sheer
size of China, one might even hypothesise that for each vil-
lage where elections are manipulated and have resulted in
even more local conflict, there is another village where such
elections operate well, make the cadres accountable and re-
sponsive, create a feeling of empowerment on the part of the
peasants, and generate social stability as well as regime legit-
imacy. In any case, the reasons for the different outcomes of
direct village elections must be properly analysed to under-
stand the decisive conditions that make them work in one
place and run into problems in another. In that sense, Lishu
is certainly instructive and should not be excluded from this
analysis merely due to its prominence as a showcase of village
democracy in contemporary China.((9)Polit i ca l  support,  r eg ime  l eg i t i-macy  and system stabil ity
In this study, we apply a model based on David Easton’s con-
cept of support as decisive for the stability of a political sys-
tem. A system is stable if it enjoys the support of the people:
We can say that A supports B either when A acts
on behalf of B or when he orients himself
favourably toward B. B may be a person or a group;
it may be a goal, idea or institution. I shall designate
supportive actions as overt support and supportive
attitudes or sentiments as covert support.((10)
According to Easton, support is directed at three major ob-
jects in a political system: the political community, i.e. “that
aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen
as a group of persons bound together by a political division
of labour”((11); the regime, i.e. the political or constitutional
order, which refers to the fundamental values, norms and in-
stitutions (authority structure) of the government; and the
political authorities, i.e. the incumbent leaders as represen-
tatives of the political order. Support is further differentiated
by Easton into “specific” and “diffuse” support. Specific
support refers to the satisfaction with the responsiveness of
the government concerning specific demands. It is short-term
and always directed at the political authorities, who are
judged by the people with respect to their policy perform-
ance, their “day-to-day actions taken in the name of a polit-
ical system”((12). Diffuse support indicates a person’s long-
term conviction that the existence and functioning of the
government conform to his or her moral or ethical principles
concerning what is right in the political sphere. It is usually
directed at the political community and—more importantly in
our context—the regime: People support a regime if they
identify with its fundamental values, norms and institutions.
However, diffuse support can also be related to incumbent
power-holders, i.e. the political authorities:
Whereas specific support is extended only to the in-
cumbent authorities, diffuse support is directed to-
wards offices themselves as well as towards their in-
dividual occupants. More than that, diffuse support
is support that underlies the regime as a whole and
the political community.((13)
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8. Haixuan, “voting out of the sea”, is a term referring to the free nomination of candidates
by all villagers before an election is called. 
9. Data collection in Lishu county may also be questioned as it is often assumed that exter-
nal researchers–especially from the West–are misled by local cadres who have accu-
mulated years of experiences with domestic and foreign visits. We still opted to go to
Lishu and examine its success story. To restrict external intervention as far as possible,
we chose two villages which had not been visited by any scholars or international
observers before. Our questionnaires were not checked by the local authorities, and we
were widely left alone to carry out the interviews. There was no indication that peasants
had been briefed by local cadres before we arrived at the villages, as they spoke
straightforwardly and did not shy away from criticism concerning cadre behaviour and
the implementation of village policies. To our understanding, the interviewees respond-
ed honestly and were unconcerned if the village cadre, who led us to their houses,
stayed on for a couple of minutes. For the questions posed, see appendix. 
10. Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1979, p. 159.
11. Ibid., p.176.
12. Easton, David, “A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support,” British Journal of
Political Science, n° 9, 1975, pp. 435-57 (p. 437 for the quotation).
13. Ibid., p.445. 
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In Easton’s framework, (the belief in) legitimacy is one form
or manifestation of diffuse support—the other being
trust((14)—and means:
the conviction on the part of the member that it is
right and proper for him to accept and obey the au-
thorities and to abide by the requirements of the
regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or ex-
plicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his
own moral principles, his own sense of what is right
and proper in the political sphere.((15)
For Easton, legitimacy as the moral consent to the regime
and the authorities is the strongest form of diffuse support
and may derive from underlying ideological principles (ideo-
logical legitimacy), from an attachment to the regime’s
norms and institutional order (structural legitimacy), or from
a devotion to or recognition of the personal qualities of in-
cumbent political leaders (personal legitimacy).
From this matrix, which summarises Easton’s argument, it
becomes clear that legitimacy depends on the public percep-
tion of a regime’s moral and structural validity (or quality)
and on the validity of the authority roles therein; and on the
perception of the validity and quality of the incumbent polit-
ical leaders. Long-term specific support for incumbent
power-holders based on their good performance may trans-
late into diffuse support and, eo ipso, overall regime legiti-
macy.((16) Assessing regime legitimacy requires, therefore,
data for both diffuse and specific support.
15N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
14. According to Easton, trust as the second form of diffuse support refers to the belief in
most systems that there is a common good that transcends individual interest, which
can be described as “the interest of realm, the public, common, or national interest, the
general good and public welfare, or the good of ‘our people’” (Easton, A Systems
Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 312). Trust means the conviction that this common
good or general interest is granted without direct individual interference and permanent
control of those in power; and is based on a feeling of symbolic satisfaction with the
political order and the processes of government. The main difference between legitima-
cy and trust in the Eastonian framework is the following: People may lose trust in their
political leaders’ capability to rule, but they may still believe in the latter’s general moral
right to rule and to expect obedience (see Westle, Bettina, Political Legitimacy: Theories,
Concepts, Empirical Findings (in Germ.), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1989, pp. 70-71). It is a
long path to tread from shattered trust to open resistance against the existent political
order, while strong bonds of trust between the ruler and the ruled strengthen this order.
Moreover, political leaders may enjoy a “bonus of trust” based on experience with their
past behaviour as corresponds to a community’s established perception of that which
constitutes the common good (Westle, Political Legitimacy, op. cit., p. 85).
15. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 278.
16. At the same time, diffuse support suffers if a system’s output is permanently deficient
and judged as such by the people.
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Figure 1. Support, legitimacy and trust in the
Eastonian model 
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From another perspective, stability results from public de-
mands on and subsequent evaluations of a system’s output
(performance). This, in turn, is followed by a round of re-
sponses to this performance, which constitute new de-
mands concerning legitimacy (ideological, structural, per-
sonal) and help to stabilise the political system. Assessing
regime legitimacy, therefore, requires an empirical analysis
of these public evaluations and responses and their legiti-
macy-building effects in each of the Eastonian sub-cate-
gories.
So how can we empirically measure support – or legiti-
macy and trust for that matter? In Muller and Jukam’s
well-established operationalisation((17) of regime legiti-
macy applied in a number of studies, diffuse support is
measured by asking respondents to assess the following
six items:
• I am proud to live under the current political system.
• I have an obligation to support the current political system.
• I respect the political institutions in China today.
• I feel that the basic rights of citizens are protected.
• I believe that the courts in China guarantee fair trials.
• I feel that my personal values are the same as those 
advocated by the government.
These items reflect Easton’s sources of legitimacy in the
matrix introduced above: Items 1 and 6 are designed to
detect the popular feeling for the values and norms of the
regime (ideological legitimacy); items 2 and 3 intend to
reveal the respondents’ general feelings about major polit-
ical institutions and the current political system (structural
legitimacy); and items 4 and 5 relate to personal evalua-
tions of the political authorities in terms of whether they
have functioned and wielded their power in accordance
with one’s sense of fairness and basic interests (personal
legitimacy).
Specific support, for its part, refers to policy fields that sup-
ply information on the efficiency of political leadership.
Based on the framework of Muller and Jukam, but also on
past field observations by other China scholars, Chen
Jie((18) has asked questions related to the following nine
items in his study on political support in urban China:
16 N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
17. Muller, Edward N. and Jukam, Thomas O., “On the Meaning of Political Support,”
American Political Science Review, vol. 77, n° 77, 1977, pp. 1561-1595. As regards the
operationalisation of diffuse and specific support, we mainly refer to Chen, Jie, “Political
Support and Participation in a Non-Democratic Society: A Study of Chinese Urban
Residents,” paper presented at the Conference “The Transformation of Citizen Politics
and Civic Attitudes in Three Chinese Societies,” Institute of Political Science, Academia
Sinica, Taipei (Taiwan), 19-20 November 2004, pp. 8-9.
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Figure 2. Legitimacy-building in an Eastonian political system
Village Elections in Contemporary China
•Controlling inflation
• Providing job security
•Minimizing the gap between rich and poor
• Improving housing conditions for all
•Maintaining order in society and community
• Providing adequate and universal medical care 
• Providing welfare services to the needy
• Fighting official corruption
• Combating pollution
These items must certainly be modified in the context of rural
China. For instance, listening to villagers’ opinions and acting
according to their demands (responsiveness), improving the
village economy (entrepreneurship), and guaranteeing fair-
ness in land distribution and financial compensation (reliabil-
ity) are arguably more important to ensure specific support
than minimising the gap between rich and poor, improving
housing conditions and combating pollution. There seems to
be less necessity to adjust the items of diffuse support, though,
as they can certainly be relevant topics both in the countryside
and in China’s cities. Interestingly, some studies have found
strikingly high degrees of trust among peasants in the central
government, which surpassed the trust they accorded to their
local leaders.((19) This would seem to indicate high levels of
regime legitimacy in terms of diffuse support but low levels of
legitimacy (concerning the local political authorities) in terms
of specific support in the Eastonian sense.((20) However, as will
be seen, our fieldwork in Lishu has found rather high levels
of specific support for local cadres which may—as we hypoth-
esise in accordance with David Easton’s own assumptions—
translate into diffuse support for the CP regime.
The Muller/Jukam approach to the measurement of support
and regime legitimacy by using quantitative methodology is
useful, but also certainly not the only viable method. Quali-
tative research offers itself as another possibility, although
this approach is usually more time-consuming and works
with much smaller samples. We believe that a distinction be-
tween public evaluations of and public responses to a
regime’s strategies to produce satisfying outputs and gener-
ate (system) stability serves as a good departure point for
tackling the legitimacy conundrum (see figure 2). Question-
naires would then need to be designed in such a way that al-
lows for assigning the contexts of the given answers to the dif-
ferent sources of legitimacy (and to trust). The data that we
present does not fully correspond to this demand; but it may
be good enough to stimulate more debate on how regime le-
gitimacy can and should be empirically grasped and traced.((21)
A br ie f  account  of  vi l lage  el ect ions in  Lishu
Since the founding of the People’s Republic up until the end
of the Cultural Revolution, China’s villages were the pillars
of energetic collectivisation efforts by the Party-state, culmi-
nating in the People’s Commune system established in the
late 1950s. While the People’s Communes exercised rigid
control in all spheres of the peasants’ life, their economic
performance was mixed. Although they successfully finalised
the Communist regime’s drive for collectivisation in agricul-
ture, they were plagued by inefficiency and failure concern-
ing the goal of raising agricultural productivity. In the late
1970s, the introduction of the household responsibility sys-
tem (家庭联产承包责任制) led to the gradual collapse
of the People’s Communes. Although this greatly enhanced
the peasants’ autonomy and material well-being by triggering
rapid production gains in the countryside, the village admin-
istrations ran into trouble. The Party leadership had to find
new answers to the question of which policies could change
this situation for the better.
In 1980, so-called villager committees (村民委员会) were
spontaneously established by peasants in Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region and the provinces of Sichuan and
Hebei in order to fill the administrative vacuum caused by
the demise of the commune system.((22) These developments
aroused the interest of Peng Zhen, a veteran revolutionary
leader and at the time vice-president of the NPC Standing
Committee who quickly became the main protagonist in ad-
vocating villager self-government.((23) When the commune
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18. Ibid., p. 9.
19. Li, Lianjiang, “Political Trust in Rural China,” Modern China, n° 2, 2004, pp. 228-58;
O’Brien and Li, “Popular Contention and its Impact in Rural China,” op. cit..
20. Peasant trust in higher levels of government can only be abstract (diffuse) while (dis-
)trust in local officials is empirically grounded and specific. Trust in the central govern-
ment becomes clear by the peasants’ belief that, for instance, petitioning at higher lev-
els can help to reign in corrupt local cadres. The government is thought to be fair and
benevolent, and the structures of government efficient. However, given the failure of the
petitioning system in many places where peasants have unsuccessfully turned to high-
er levels for help, regime legitimacy in terms of diffuse support is in increasing danger. 
21. For further reference concerning the conceptual handling of the “support”-category see
also Chen, Jie, “Popular Support for Village Self-government in China,” op. cit.., and Chen,
Jie; Lu, Chunglong and Yang Yiyin, Popular Support for Grassroots Self-Government in
Urban China. Findings from a Beijing Survey (forthcoming in Modern China).
22. See Horsley, Jamie P., “A Legal Perspective on the Development of Electoral Democracy
in China. The Case of Village Elections,” in Stephen C. Hsu, Understanding China’s Legal
System, New York-London, New York University Press, 2003, pp. 295-352 (p. 298).
23. Peng Zhen’s support is normally attributed to his positive experiences with village self-
government during the revolutionary war. For a compilation of his comments on the
issue between 1982-1987, see Minzhengbu (Ministry of Civil Affairs), Peng Zhen tongzhi
guanyu cunmin weiyuanhui jumin weiyuanhui de zhongyao jianghua (Important
Speeches of Comrade Peng Zhen on Villagers’ Committees and Residents Committees),
Beijing, 1990.
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system was formally abolished in the revised PRC constitu-
tion of 1982 and the township reinstated as the lowest level
of government, directly elected village committees became
officially sanctioned as “autonomous grassroots organisations
of the masses” (基层群众性自治组织), responsible for
administering public affairs, mediating in civil disputes and
maintaining social order. Hence rural self-government was
beginning to take root in the countryside; and though it was
not yet specified by law, it allowed the township authorities
to exert wide-ranging control over the villages. When in
1987 the “Organic Law on Village Committees” was prom-
ulgated (at first on an experimental basis), the legal grounds
of villager self-government were strengthened and its prac-
tice experienced rapid initial progress. 
Already in 1986, Jilin province’s Lishu county established a
Guiding Small Group on the Experimental Restructuring of
and Tutoring on Village Committees (梨树县村委会
整顿补课试点指导小组) as a response to a Circular on
Earnest Efforts to Make Better Village and Urban Neigh-
bourhood Committees in the Process of Grassroots Party
Consolidation (关于在基层整党中认真搞好村民
委员会和居民委员会建设的通知) issued by the
provincial authorities. In December 1986, under the control
of the Guiding Small Group, the first direct village elections
ever held in Lishu took place in Beilaohao (北老壕) vil-
lage. In accordance with the 1982 constitution, peasants in
Beilaohao were allowed to freely nominate candidates who
were then allowed to run in the official village election ac-
cording to the number of votes they received in the primary.
The outcome of this experiment was expressly welcomed by
the Jilin provincial government and the Ministry of Civil Af-
fairs, the latter of which took charge of implementing the
system of villager self-government.((24)
Further elections were held in 1988, 1992 and 1995. In the
1992 round, Pingan (平安) village in Lishu’s Shuanghe
(双河) township faced some trouble: The local Party author-
ities determined the candidates, yet Pingan’s peasants re-
jected them. At the same time, the villagers’ preferred candi-
dates were not permitted to run for office by the village and
township Party officials. Finally, the county authorities de-
cided to turn to the method which had been applied in Beilao-
hao village back in 1986. Each peasant was given a white
piece of paper and asked to write down the name of their can-
didate of choice. Those who gained the most votes were enti-
tled to run in the upcoming village elections. When this solu-
tion turned out to be successful, as publicly nominated cadres
were indeed elected into office, it was formalised in 1993 and
quickly institutionalised throughout the county.((25)
In the fourth round of village elections held in 1995, the
haixuan method described above was finally applied
throughout Jilin province. Furthermore, the candidates were
allowed to make campaign speeches up until the final vote.
The principles of multi-candidate elections and casting se-
cret ballots were, among other issues, written into local 
election regulations. Finally, when the Organic Law
(村民委员会组织法) was revised and enforced nation-
wide in 1998, the central government drew on the Lishu ex-
perience to include the direct election of candidates in the
law (Art. 14). Since then, village elections in China must
have open primaries before the final ballot is cast. In the
1998 elections, Lishu county went a step further and let the
members of the village committee be voted directly into of-
fice by the haixuan method if they immediately secured
more than 50% of all votes cast.((26) Since then, it has seen
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24. See Xu Weiliang (余维良): The diary of Lishu’s village autonomy (梨树县村民自治
大事记), http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=221410&ID=29589
(accessed on 22 March 2007). It is not quite clear for what particular reasons the
authorities initiated the direct ballot in Lishu county at the time. According to one of our
interviewees at Lishu’s local office of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, some peasants in a vil-
lage tried to get rid of a cadre whom they strongly disliked and came up with the idea
of having an election to do so. This incident aligned with the debate on implementing
direct village elections within the Party leadership, made the peasants’ demand politi-
cally opportune and induced Lishu’s local officials to give it a try. If that is true, local
agency and risk-taking—probably motivated by hopes of earning “career credit” in case
of success or simply feelings of public responsibility by concerned cadres—were the
main factors responsible for creating the “Lishu experience”.
25. For details see: “Haixuan is a brand-new democratic model created by the peasants”
(“海选”是农民创造的一种崭新民主模式), http://www.chinarural.org/news_
show.aspx?cols=11&ID=32513 (accessed on 22 March 2007). Haixuan means—in a
metaphorical sense—to fish for pearls in the open sea, i.e. voting, among many choic-
es, for somebody of one’s own trust or liking.
26. See Xu Weiliang : The “haixuan” model develops by being practiced—view and learn
from the fourth re-election of village committees in Lishu county, Jilin province
(“海选”模式在实践中发展 - 吉林省梨树县村委会第四届换届选举观摩),
http://www.chinarural.org/news_show.aspx?cols=11&ID=29589 (accessed on 22
March 2007).
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another two rounds of successful elections (2001, 2004),
maintaining its reputation as a showcase of village self-gov-
ernment and stable cadre-peasant relations in contemporary
rural China.Assessing  the  f ie ld  data
In our comparative project on institutional change in rural
China,((27) we were mainly concerned with the relationship
between (the implementation of) direct village elections and
the political awareness of peasants, the latter measured in
terms of political knowledge, political efficacy and political
participation. Our objective was to learn more about the de-
velopment of citizenship in China’s villages, and how that af-
fects regime legitimacy and system stability. We did not set
up our questionnaires along the lines of Muller and Jukam
and their operationalisation of Easton’s model. However,
some elements of their work can be found in individual ques-
tions. We start with a brief summary of our main findings in
Lishu county as they relate to four thematic sets of ques-
tions: knowledge of the electoral process; knowledge of vil-
lage politics; political efficacy; and political participation.
We then interpret the data against the background of the
Eastonian model in order to determine the relationship be-
tween village elections and regime legitimacy. We add some
caveats to our results, pointing at the possibility that the data
may be interpreted differently.
1 .  Knowledge  of  the  e lec toral  p rocess 
The peasants interviewed in our two field sites in Lishu
County were generally well informed about the electoral
process and strongly welcomed the direct ballot in their vil-
lages. Among the respondents, 39 out of 56 (69.6%) were
able to precisely or approximately remember the number of
direct elections that had taken place in their village so far,
and 47 (83.9%) called them “very popular”. Among respon-
dents 41 (73.2%) stated that all their neighbours and rela-
tives had voted. Proxy voting seemed to have occurred only
in some isolated cases. In all, 33 (58.9%) respondents could
recall precisely or approximately the nomination procedure
in their village, which was based on the haixuan method and
a successive series of campaign speeches of those candidates
who qualified to run in the final election. Twenty-seven
(48.2%) interviewees knew about the Organic Law, which
is propagated actively in Lishu county. Many of our respon-
dents were very proud of their village enjoying regular direct
elections and not a few pointed at the elections’ steady rise
in popularity among the people after the haixuan method
had been institutionalised. Obviously, the relatively high de-
gree of knowledge related to the electoral process was also a
result of the efforts of township and county authorities. All
local cadres in Lishu who are responsible for village elec-
tions must undergo regular training at higher government lev-
els. They must also teach the peasants about the Organic
Law as well as the local regulations concerning electoral im-
plementation, especially when another election is approach-
ing. Consequently, Lishu’s peasants are well informed about
the legal framework of the direct ballot in their villages.
2.  Knowledge  of  v i l lage  pol it ics
Most peasants in the two villages that we visited seemed to
be very to at least fairly familiar with the role that the village
Party branch plays in an election: 22 out of 55 (40%) re-
spondents seemed to be fully aware of this role, whilst 18
(32.7%) showed at least some understanding of it. More-
over, 22 interviewees (40%) appeared to fully understand
the impact of direct elections on the relations between the
Party branch and the village committee, with another 19
(34.5%) having at least some understanding of it. More pre-
cisely, the overwhelming majority of peasants had no doubts
about the predominance of the Party branch over the village
committee and the final say of the Party secretary in all im-
portant matters, even if the village director had been elected
and enjoyed more democratic legitimacy.((28) The overall ma-
jority emphasised that no significant change regarding the
administration of the village had taken place since the intro-
duction of direct elections, though there were some who
pointed at such change and stated that relations between the
Party branch and the village committee were more “up-to-
standard” (现有规范) today. Apparently, the hierarchical
relationship between the village Party secretary as the “first
hand (or string)” (第一把手) and the village director as
the second (第二把手) had survived the institutionalisa-
tion of village elections and the Party secretary’s authority
was not contested.((29)
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27. For details see Appendix 1.
28. See also Guo, Zhenglin and Bernstein, Thomas P., “The Impact of Elections on the Village
Structure of Power: The Relations between the Village Committees and the Party
Branches,” Journal of Contemporary China, n° 39, 2004, pp. 257-75, who place empha-
sis on the unchallenged authority of the Party secretary in many villages as well, albeit
from a more institutional perspective.
29. It must be noted here that only 16% of our respondents were Party members (see
Appendix, Tab. 3), underlining that a substantial majority of non-Party members held this
opinion.
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At the same time, our respondents did not seem well in-
formed about or interested in the state of village-township re-
lations, though still a majority of 34 out of 55 (61.2%) inter-
viewees made statements suggesting full or at least some un-
derstanding of this issue, for instance by firmly stating that
such relations were good, that the township guided the vil-
lages or that the villages had to obey the township. But con-
trary to their assessment of relations between the Party
branch and village committee, peasants in Lishu seemed less
aware of the impact of the direct ballot on village-township
relations: Only 2 (3.6%) respondents were clear on this mat-
ter, while 53 (96.4%) could not make statements suggesting
full or at least some understanding of the issue, and many of
the respondents simply did not know. In most cases, the
peasants would say that no change had occurred
(“没有变化”; “都一样”), indicating that they had no
specific opinion on the township government’s role in village
elections and village politics. At the same time, however, 32
(58.2%) respondents seemed to fully or approximately un-
derstand how the township government reacted to direct vil-
lage elections, mostly ascertaining that the township wel-
comed these elections and would take good care to imple-
ment them properly, for instance by sending down township
government and Party officials to oversee the electoral
process and advise village cadres. Obviously, the peasants in
our two research sites had nothing bad to say about their
township government and just stated matter-of-factly the lat-
ter’s predominance over the village as they had always per-
ceived it. Some respondents evoked the impression that to
them the township’s guidance of the village was a good
thing, and that relations between the two were similar to
those in a family (“关系都挺好，他们像一家人”).
Concerning the influence of clans, 31 (56.4%) of our re-
spondents made a statement indicating full understanding
and another 23 (41.8%) seemed to have at least some un-
derstanding of the issue, with both groups maintaining al-
most unanimously that even if clans were existent and some
clan influence on village politics could be perceived, it did
not have any major political impact. As a matter of fact,
clans are not assumed to be important power-brokers in
northeast China, an area of heavy migration in former times
that worked against any firm entrenchment of clan structures
in the countryside.((30)
3.  Poli t ical  e f f icacy
Generally spoken, peasants in Lishu show a high degree of
political efficacy. However, this finding must be qualified:
All 55 respondents had voted in the last village election and
51 out of 55 (92.7%) respondents remembered exactly how
many times they voted in the last election—which can entail
multiple votes, as any candidate must cross a 50% threshold
before he/she is declared a winner. When asked why they
voted (or did not vote) in the last election, 39 out of 56
(69.6%) respondents made a statement indicating strong
support for village elections, often by emphasising that this
was their right (“这是我的权力”). Only 4 (7.1%) respon-
dents showed indifference towards village elections by stress-
ing that there were rules to follow (“有规定”), that voting
was an obligation (“我的义务”), that everybody voted
(“大家投”) or that voting is of no use (“没用”); none of
the village residents was totally negative in their response
concerning the direct ballot. Fifty respondents (89.3%) de-
clared that they would vote in the next election too, and em-
phasised—when asked for the reasons—the importance of
electing officials of their liking (“喜欢的人”), installing ca-
pable cadres (“有能力的干部”), or bringing people into
office whom they trusted (“信任的人”). Forty-eight re-
spondents (85.7%) insisted that their vote was important be-
cause the outcome of an election could depend on a single
ballot, and because only by voting could the election of ca-
pable and trusted officials be ensured. These findings were
compatible with many positive assessments of electoral im-
plementation in our two villages: all 56 respondents (!)
maintained that elections were fair, while 48 (85.7%) be-
lieved that the election procedures were honest and fully ex-
ecuted according to the law. Moreover, 47 (83.9%) respon-
dents expressed their satisfaction with the nomination proce-
dure of candidates for an election.
Forty-seven respondents (83.9%) stated that an elected vil-
lage leader serves the people better than a nominated one,
which highlights that direct elections of the village commit-
tee in Lishu have become “the only game in town”. Even
more importantly, 46 (83.6%) respondents claimed that di-
rect elections had brought advantages to their village, enu-
merating very different issues ranging from practical improve-
ments of village life (e.g. road building and repair; agricul-
tural development; credit distribution) to overall economic
progress (including more jobs) and—most notably—the re-
cruitment of better and more responsive cadres. Only 10
(17.6%) interviewees saw no change compared to former
times. Thirty-four respondents (60.7%) made a positive
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30. However, two respondents from B village stated that clans controlled significant num-
bers of votes and were an important factor in the Village Representative Assembly.
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statement when asked if direct elections have made the vil-
lage committee better at listening to the peasant’s demands.
Eighteen respondents (32.1%), however, saw no significant
change in their village since the introduction of direct elec-
tions and four (7.1%) expressed disdain for village elections
with respect to cadre responsiveness. Twenty-six respondents
(46.4%) said that they felt a significant or at least some de-
gree of change in the behaviour of the village director since
the introduction of direct elections, suggesting more cadre
responsiveness to the peasants’ demands. However, more
than half of our respondents (53.6%) saw no significant
change or were unable to make a clear statement. Finally, 28
(50%) of our respondents thought that direct elections had
given them more influence over village politics, though they
often could not specify to what extent and in regard to which
issues; the same number either said that there was no signif-
icant change concerning their political leverage vis-à-vis the
village authorities or simply could not give a clear answer. 
Hence, in terms of political efficacy we came across an in-
teresting gap concerning what peasants think about their
general empowerment by the direct ballot which they regard
as very substantial (pointing at a high degree of internal ef-
ficacy), and how they assess the relevancy of these elections
for making local cadres more responsive to their demands,
which they consider less substantial (pointing at a lower de-
gree of external efficacy). 
4.  Poli t ical  part icipat ion
In our two research sites direct village elections did not
greatly increase the level of political participation in terms of
active involvement in village affairs between elections, nor
did they raise expectations of more democratic change in the
future. Twenty-five out of 56 respondents (44.64%) stated
that they had indeed become more interested in village pol-
itics because of direct elections and would also participate
more in the present, for example by contacting their village
committee concerning personal matters or taking part in a
village assembly session. However, 18 (40%) respondents
declared that village elections had not raised their political
interest whatsoever, while another 13 (23.6%) simply re-
marked that they had not experienced any change or were
not able to answer the question. Only 2 (3.6%) respondents
participated in any form of political protest in the village,
while 39 (69.6%) never did and 15 (26.8%) respondents
did not answer the question at all, indicating that such
protests were not an issue in our villages.
Twenty-nine respondents (52.7%) thought that the village
party committee should actively engage in the organisation
of an election, welcoming its leadership role in this process.
Eleven respondents (20%) opined to the contrary and re-
jected an active involvement of the Party branch, while 15
(26.8%) held no specific stance on this issue or were not
aware of it. Twenty-one (38.2%) of our interviewees ex-
pressed a desire that the Party secretary be elected by all vil-
lagers, i.e. including non-Party members. Eighteen (27.3%)
rejected this option and maintained that the Party secretary
can or should only be elected by the members of the village
Party committee. Eighteen respondents (32.7%) held that
this issue did not matter or they had no knowledge of it. Ap-
parently, village elections—although they have taken place
for years—have not generated a significant trend towards de-
mands of greater ‘horizontal democratisation’, i.e. with the
introduction of a direct ballot for choosing the Party secre-
tary.((31) At the same time, when asked if they would like to
see the extension of direct elections to the township level, 21
(37.5%) of our respondents agreed, while 18 (32.1%) de-
clined the idea, mostly because of the personal distance they
saw between the villagers and the township head, who they
hardly knew (“不认识他”). A surprising number of 17
(30.4%) respondents had no specific opinion on this issue,
or made unspecific or contradictory statements, e.g. by stat-
ing that though direct elections of the township head were a
good thing, peasants would not be able to know for whom to
vote (“直选好,可是我投给谁?)”. It becomes clear that
village elections in Lishu have—at least so far—not been suc-
cessful in producing any loud demands for a ‘vertical democ-
ratisation’. We made some additional interesting observa-
tions in the field: 
• Cadre turnover in the village committee had remained
very low over the years, indicating the existence of an es-
tablished “political class” of village cadres who were in
charge. However, some villagers who we met were very
eager to run as candidates for the village committee and
prepared for their campaigns by posting themselves near
the village committee building and talking to peasants
whenever the opportunity arose. 
• The relationship between the Party secretary and the vil-
lage director seemed to be co-operative and professional,
especially in village A, which had a rather sound collec-
tive economy and just recently set up a small Economic
Development Zone (经济开发区) for attracting local
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data gathered in the 1990s. This highlights the problem of making sound statements on
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capital.((32) Both officials followed a clear division of labour,
with the village director taking care of the daily matters of
village administration and the Party secretary maintaining
communication with the township authorities. However, it
was clear that the Party secretary was in command and en-
joyed much more respect and power in the village. 
• All village and township cadres responsible for the execu-
tion of village elections seemed to take their work ex-
tremely seriously and repeatedly emphasised that the out-
come of these elections was the most important indicator
of a cadre’s efficiency and overall quality. They also
stressed that elections had contributed significantly to the
maintaining of local stability.
• The overwhelming majority of the villagers we met
seemed to feel truly empowered by the direct ballot, as
they emphatically insisted on the importance of their right
to vote and its significance for making a difference in an
election. However, they did not show any inclination to
translate this felt empowerment into concrete pressure on
their cadres. On the one hand, they vehemently insisted
on their democratic right to vote and expressed their
strong interest in taking part in elections. On the other
hand, they did not consider the direct ballot as a weapon
to be used against unfair or bad cadres in the first place,
but much more as a complementary instrument to place
trusted officials in charge. This suggests that peasant-
cadre relations are less tense in Lishu than they obviously
are in other localities in rural China.Discussing  l eg i t imacy
So what does our data say about the possibility of more
regime legitimacy through institutional change in the local
state? We are fully aware—as will appear in the caveats
below—that our interpretations have a somewhat lopsided
character given the ambiguous nature of some of the data
that we gathered. This highlights a couple of methodological
problems as well as some other concerns regarding the em-
pirical measurement of legitimacy. These are not easy to
overcome, especially in the Chinese context with its still lim-
ited possibilities to conduct fieldwork on such sensitive issues
as political support and regime (cadre) legitimacy in the local
state. However, as mentioned above, our assessment may
contribute to the current debate on the CP regime’s “author-
itarian resilience”, to borrow a term from Andrew Nathan,
and on the scope and limits of reform-led legitimacy-building
in contemporary China that may explain why the current
regime is more stable than usually acknowledged.((33)
Ideo log ica l  leg it imacy
Ideological legitimacy derives from the moral conviction
that the current regime (the political order) as such and
the (roles of the) political authorities are valid and accept-
able. Hence, we must ask at a general level if the political
order in the local state and the authority roles of the local
leaders enjoy such legitimacy in the eyes of the peasants
in Lishu. As is well known, the Party-state has introduced
direct village elections in order to enhance the quality of
local governance. To that end, peasants should participate
more actively in village self-government and have some
control over their cadres. Quite certainly, village elections
were not implemented in order to initiate some sort of bot-
tom-up democratisation in which the Party would be grad-
ually submitted to the Chinese demos by a successive ex-
tension of the direct ballot to higher administrative levels.
Village elections were, as it seems, of pure instrumental
value to resolve problems in administering the country-
side; they were supposed to stabilise cadre-peasant rela-
tions and to remain “parochial”, i.e. strictly bound to the
rural villages of China. 
Our data does not explicitly tell us if and to what extent
peasants in Lishu subscribe to the regime’s rationale for 
village self-government and grassroots democracy 
(基层民主). However, they obviously support electoral
reform as an important step to give more political power
to the people and enable them to elect “good” and capa-
ble cadres into office. Our respondents did not demand
the extension of direct elections to the township level and
did not criticise the township authorities. On the contrary,
those who showed full or partial understanding of the
township’s role concerning the implementation of direct
elections and local politics in general were rather support-
ive of its authority. All in all, the peasants in Lishu
seemed to give considerable credit to the government for
implementing village elections, and to the political author-
ities for taking their interests more seriously, suggesting
high levels of ideological regime legitimacy in the Easton-
ian sense. 
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32. This “village EDZ”, as many others, had been declared illegal in 2003 by higher author-
ities because it violated government regulations concerning environmental protection
and the misuse of energy, but also because of low infrastructural quality. However, in
2005 the government of Lishu county established an “Economic Development Zone”
itself of which A village then became a part by setting up a sub-unit EDZ.
33. See “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy,
vol. 14, n° 1 (January 2003), pp. 6-17. See also Schubert, Gunter, “One-Party Rule and
the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary China: preliminary thoughts on setting up a
new research agenda,” (forthcoming in Journal of Contemporary China).
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Structure
Structural legitimacy derives from the belief that the institu-
tional order and the norms of the current regime are valid
and acceptable. We found that the system of direct village
elections in Lishu, the main feedback mechanism within the
institutional order at the grassroots level, enjoyed great pop-
ularity among the peasants. A high degree of support could
be established for their procedural and legal fairness. Village
elections obviously gave our respondents a feeling of empow-
erment vis-à-vis the village authorities, as solid majorities of
peasants claimed that their vote was important, that they
had become more interested in village politics, and that the
direct ballot had made the village committee listen more to
the wishes and demands of the peasants. Interestingly, our
respondents were evenly split on the question as to whether
direct elections had given them more influence in village pol-
itics, with 50% holding this viewpoint and another 50% stat-
ing no change or giving no clear answer. Apparently, the
peasants’ feeling of personal empowerment—or their internal
efficacy—was not fully matched by an expectation that the
village cadres, as institutional power holders, would respond
to their demands, indicating lower levels of external efficacy
compared to internal efficacy in the two villages that we in-
vestigated. This phenomenon, however, is not necessarily
jeopardising structural regime legitimacy (see below).
The established power hierarchy between the Party secre-
tary and the village director had not been challenged by the
direct ballot and was widely taken for granted. Although a
relative majority of peasants thought that the Party secretary
should also be elected by all villagers, 60% of our respon-
dents rejected this option or held no specific opinion on the
question. As a matter of fact, the privileged position of the
Party secretary in the village seemed to be generally ac-
cepted. None of our respondents brought up the issue of a
village-wide election of this post on their own accord during
the interviews. Moreover, a strong majority of peasants wel-
comed the active participation of the Party committee in the
organisation and execution of village elections. At the same
time, many respondents stated that the township government
followed village elections with much attention and took care
that they were properly carried out, indicating a rather pos-
itive view of the township authorities’ role in the electoral
process. Also, the guiding role of the township government
vis-à-vis the village was not critically questioned, but rather
taken for granted, and actually welcomed by most peasants.
Generally speaking, an overwhelming majority of our re-
spondents saw both the relations between the village Party
branch and the village committee and between the village
and the township government as remaining unchanged by
the direct ballot and obviously did not lament this fact. This
suggests at least a “tacit structural legitimacy” based on the
“tradition” of the existing political order in Lishu, as strong
peasant support for village elections has not led to demands
for substantial change concerning the existing political insti-
tutions and power relationships in the local state. 
Caveat  I
We have not focused in our interviews on the degree of
our respondents’ (diffuse and specific) support of the
existing order and the political authorities. So what we
have denoted “tacit structural legitimacy” must be taken
as hypothetical and substantiated by further research. 
Personal  legit imacy
Personal legitimacy derives from the belief that the incum-
bents, i.e. the political leaders, are well qualified and, thus,
acceptable. Although our respondents welcomed direct elec-
tions as an institutional innovation, they were somewhat
more cautious in judging their cadres, i.e. the incumbent
leaders in the village whom they meet on a daily basis. As
has been mentioned above, a 60% majority of peasants
thought that they had gained more leverage over the village
committee in the era of direct elections, as cadres would
now listen more to their wishes. At the same time, however,
only half of our respondents stated that they had gained
more influence over specific decisions made by village au-
thorities, e.g. with respect to fixing grain quotas, construct-
ing roads and schools, modernising irrigation systems or
founding new collective enterprises. Still, this does not nec-
essarily suggest that the local cadres in our two villages suf-
fered from a legitimacy crisis. Although some respondents
uttered disapproval of them for various reasons (often re-
lated to their disappointment over the village committee’s re-
strictive decisions on allocating credits), many of them ac-
knowledged that the cadres had become more responsive to
the villagers’ demands and that they accepted the direct bal-
lot as a measurement of their right to rule. 
In our surveys, an overwhelming majority of more than 80%
of our respondents declared that direct elections had brought
advantages to their village. Besides naming economic and
agricultural development in general, they pointed at practical
improvements (such as new roads and irrigation systems, a
new school, etc.), and many peasants emphasised that elec-
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tions had produced better cadres! At the same time, our re-
spondents established a strong positive correlation between
direct elections and more cadre efficiency and trustworthi-
ness, but—as stated before—a weaker correlation between vil-
lage elections and their immediate impact on the political
decision-making process in the village. To put it differently:
The cadres seemed to enjoy a high degree of autonomy (in
spite of being elected), but were seen to use this autonomy
in a more responsible (and responsive) way than they had in
the past. Though our questionnaire did not focus on gener-
ating more systematic findings as to what the peasants
thought about their political leaders, we found quite a few
indications that trust in the cadres did play an important
role, and that trust may be a key concept in understanding
the observations of election-driven cadre autonomy and in-
creased cadre responsiveness vis-à-vis the peasants’ demands
(see below).
Caveat  I I
Trust was not systematically checked in our question-
naires as an explanatory variable for the cadres’ auton-
omy and the gap between the peasants’ internal and ex-
ternal efficacy. The suggestion that a low degree of ex-
ternal efficacy remains unproblematic, because a bond
of trust between the cadres and the peasants suffi-
ciently compensates for it, must certainly be investi-
gated more thoroughly.
Conclusion and future research
If we discount the caveats made above and find our main hy-
pothesis verified, then the “empowering effect of village
elections”((34) in rural China does not necessarily bring about
pressure on local officials and the institutional order, nor
does it pose a threat to political stability. Equally possible is
a consolidation of peasant-cadre relations, resulting in more
legitimacy for incumbent leaders and for the institutional
order in the local state, arguably translating into overall
regime legitimacy. This is conditional upon the local cadres’
willingness to subject themselves to the direct ballot, a will-
ingness that itself certainly depends on their confidence in
their political survival in the age of elections. But where
does this confidence come from? 
In Lishu, as we concluded, it does not originate in the skil-
ful manipulation of the electoral process by an established
and powerful political elite. Elections were well imple-
mented following the stipulations of the Organic Law and
positively received by the peasants. Economic success—or
economic performance of Lishu’s cadres for that matter—
may be a factor, but given the moderate degree of develop-
ment in Lishu county, it does not appear to be decisive ei-
ther. At this point, informal institutions may come into play
as explanatory variables. For instance, Lily Tsai has pointed
at the significance of “solidarity groups”—most notably tem-
ple and lineage institutions—that can ensure peasant co-op-
eration and enforce compliance with policy requirements in
a village, but also bestow authority on local cadres who as-
sume the roles of leaders within these groups.((35) However,
in our villages in Lishu, no such “solidarity groups” existed
or wielded significant influence. 
Hence, we would argue that the concept of rational trust—
or trust as “encapsulated interest” (Russell Hardin)((36)—
within a “modernised” moral economy((37) of asymmetric
(but mutual, i.e. reciprocal) relations between cadres and
peasants is helpful to understand what is going on in Lishu.
We believe that rational trust—a special manifestation of con-
tractual thinking—is a concept that deserves more attention
in further research on post-election village politics.((38)
Lishu’s peasants trust their cadres as they can reasonably ex-
pect that these cadres respond positively to the peasants’ in-
terests, since the cadres want to get re-elected and hence
maintain a close relationship with the peasants. This results
in social stability and the continuation of the established
order in the village which is in the interest of both the cadres
and the peasants. Although their relationship is not charac-
terised by horizontal political ties and the established cadre
24 N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
34. Li Lianjiang, “The Empowering Effects of Village Elections,” op. cit..
35. Lily Tsai argues that these informal institutions are therefore far more effective for pub-
lic goods provision than formal institutions like village elections. See “The Struggle of
Village Public Goods Provision,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, Grassroots
Political Reform in Contemporary China, Cambridge/Mass., Harvard University Press,
2007, pp. 117-48.
36. Hardin, Russell, “Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions,” in Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Strategy and Choice, Cambridge/Mass., MIT Press, 1991, 185-209 and “Do We Want
Trust in Government?,” in Mark E. Warren, Democracy and Trust, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1999, pp. 22-41.
37. The term “moral economy” certainly needs more theoretical refinement. Generally
speaking, we refer here to the village community as a closely-knit economic and social
entity based on principles of reciprocity, fairness, and justice to ensure survival in the
face of scarcity.
38. See Brandtstädter, Susanne and Schubert, Gunter, “Democratic Thought and Practice in
Rural China,” Democratization, n° 5, 2005, pp. 801-19; Schubert, Gunter, “Authority,
Trust and Legitimacy in the PRC (in Germ.),” China aktuell, n° 2, 2006, pp. 5-39;
Schubert, Gunter, Village Elections, Citizenship and Regime Legitimacy in the PRC,
Tuebingen, Institute of Chinese and Korean Studies, GCS-Paper No. 5, 2006. Trust and
trustworthiness are also investigated—though from a different analytical angle—by
Melanie Manion, “Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China,”
Comparative Political Studies, n º. 3, 2006, pp. 301-24, who identifies contestation and
inclusive voting procedures as their major explanatory variables.
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elite in the village remains in charge, it is the peasants’ trust
in their cadres, strengthened—or rejuvenated—by the elec-
toral mode, that lends it sufficient stability. At the same
time, village elections serve as an assurance that this trust is
honoured, but—once again—not as a means to submit the
cadres to the peasants’ will and, consequently, to undo the
established power structure which is entrenched in the moral
economy of the village: As the cadres respect the fact that
the peasants have been made citizens by the direct ballot
and must be taken seriously as such, the peasants respect the
cadres’ supremacy in the village and do not challenge their
exclusive power. Only if the cadres misuse the “bonus of
trust” that they enjoy by engaging in corruption, electoral
manipulation or outright repression of peasants, then the lat-
ter would start to mistrust, protest and rebel. However, as
trust in Lishu is honoured on both sides, the villages that we
investigated remain stable and the political order fairly legit-
imate—at least for the time being. Rational trust in law-abid-
ing and responsive local officials supported and reinforced
by fair elections may explain why in Lishu turnover in the
village committees is low and cadre legitimacy high. Ra-
tional trust in combination with a moral economy based on
reciprocal relations and an established social order that hon-
ours “just leadership”((39) may also explain why cadre legiti-
macy does not require a complete horizontalisation of peas-
ant-cadre relations at the present time. 
These assumptions, however, must be more thoroughly ex-
plored by sound empirical research. If they do hold and the
Lishu experience can be repeated in other places, this
would open a window of opportunity for the CP regime to
further strengthen its “authoritarian resilience” by piecemeal
reform and adaptation. With trust apparently destroyed in
many parts of rural China by law-breaking and corrupt
cadres, as so many reports tell us, the perspectives for gen-
eralising the Lishu experience seem bleak. Still, there could
be many (non-reported) places like Lishu “out there” yet to
be identified as what they are, namely “trust villages”.
These are villages in which the cadre-peasant nexus is firmly
established by contractual thinking derived from both the tra-
ditional village order and modern political institutions, most
notably village elections. Though this is a hypothesis that
sounds not familiar to the ears of many China scholars, to
dismiss the Lishu example as too unique—and therefore ir-
relevant—could be a major analytical mistake leading to seri-
ous misunderstandings and flawed interpretations of China’s
ongoing process of political and administrative reform. •
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39. The issue of “procedural justice (or fairness)” comes to mind, which has been highlight-
ed by some authors to explain why peasants would support elections and accept offi-
cial policies even if they find their cadres morally unacceptable or disagree with their
policies. In a fine recent paper, John J. Kennedy (2007) has introduced the term “intrin-
sic support” to name the peasants’ preference for procedural fairness over outcomes in
China’s grassroots democracy. Peasants may have very negative opinions on the state
of the local economy but still support village elections—and the cadres who are respon-
sible for their proper implementation. Procedural justice—facing the odds of a sluggish
local economy—may indeed be an important explanatory variable for explaining still
decent levels of political stability and legitimacy in China’s countryside and must be
more thoroughly researched in the future. Also, it should and can be linked to the con-
cept of (rational) trust embedded in a village’s moral economy that we suggest here.
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Appendix 1.
General remarks concerning fieldwork
This article is part of a comparative research project entitled
“Institutional Change, Participation and Political Awareness
in Rural and Urban China” jointly undertaken by the author
and Thomas Heberer (University of Duisburg-Essen).
Fieldwork was conducted in two villages of Buji Township in
Longgang District of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
during November/December 2002 and—after both villages
were transformed into urban neighbourhoods—again in
March 2005; in two villages of Dongcun Township, Fenyi
County, Xinyu City in Jiangxi province during July/August
2003; and in two villages of Lishu Township, Lishu County,
Siping City in Jilin province during August 2004. Qualita-
tive data was gathered on the basis of three different sets of
semi-structured questionnaires for peasants, elected village
cadres and higher cadres working at the township, county
and prefecture levels. In each village of the Jiangxi and Jilin
case studies, thirty villagers (selected at random by drawing
on the household registration records of each village first,
after which the sample was modified to give gender and age
appropriate representation and then complemented by a
backup group where a selected villager was not available)
and three elected village cadres were interviewed. In addi-
tion, ten to twelve higher cadres were also interviewed. In
Shenzhen, the sample had to be reduced in each category
for organisational reasons. The entire sample covered 204
respondents. Each interview lasted between 40 minutes and
two hours, during which our respondents—according to the
sample category to which they belonged—were asked to re-
call and opine on a wide range of issues concerning direct
village elections. The questionnaires—besides asking for
basic information related to each village’s demographic and
economic situation and for respondents’ biographical data—
contained 37 questions for peasants, 23 questions for elected
village cadres, and 16 questions for higher cadres. Data eval-
uation was based on the conventions of qualitative content
analysis. This was complemented by a standardisation of the
responses by simple coding to develop an index of (democ-
ratic) political awareness for villagers and village cadres in
each of the three locations.
In this article we only draw upon the data gathered in inter-
views with selected peasants in villages A and B in Lishu
township, Lishu county. 
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Appendix 2. Jilin case study: 
basic data from villages A and B
Appendix 3.
Respondent data of Jilin case study
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Appendix 4.
Survey questions
A. Knowledge  o f  the  el ecto ra l  process
1. How many direct elections have taken place in your vil-
lage to date?
2. Are elections very popular in your village?
3. Do your family members, neighbours and friends also
vote?
4. How are candidates for elections nominated in your vil-
lage?
5. Do you know or have you ever heard of the “Organic
Law on Village Committees” and its regulations?
B. Knowledge  o f  v i l lage poli t ics and inst itutions
6. According to your understanding, what role does the
Party branch play in an election? Can you explain what
the Party branch does exactly?
7. Do you think that elections have changed the relation-
ship between the Party branch and the village commit-
tee to any extent?
8. Do clans play an important role in village elections and
village politics?
9. Generally speaking, how has the township government
reacted to the elections in your village?
10. Have you observed any change in village-township rela-
tions since the introduction of direct elections? Have
any major problems arisen?
11. How do you see the present state of relations between
the village committee and your township government?
C. Poli t ical  e f f icacy
12. Did you vote in the last election?
13. How often did you vote in the last village election?
14. Why did you vote? Why didn’t you vote?
15. Are you going to vote in the next election, too?
16. Do you think that your vote is important?
17. Do you think that elections in your village are fair? Do
you think that you have a real choice between candi-
dates in elections?
18. Do you think that election procedures in your village are
honest and carried out according to the law? 
19. Are you satisfied with the nomination procedure of can-
didates for elections in your village?
20. Do you think that an elected village director serves the
people better than a leader nominated by the township
government?
21. Generally speaking, do you think that elections have
made the village committee listen to the villagers more?
22. Do you perceive any change in the behaviour of the vil-
lage director as a result of the direct elections?
23. Do you think that the elections have brought advantages
to your village (for instance, more economic develop-
ment and social welfare, better roads, new schools etc.)?
24. Do you think that elections have given you more influ-
ence on important decisions made in the village, (e.g.
concerning the fixation of grain quotas, the construction
of roads and schools, development projects such as irri-
gation systems, the founding of new collective enter-
prises, etc.)?
D. Polit ica l  part i cipation
25. Have you become more interested in village politics
since direct elections have been implemented in your vil-
lage? For instance, do you attend more meetings of the
Village Assembly or do you contact the village direc-
tor/village committee for personal matters more often
than you did before?
26. Have you ever participated in some form of political
protest? Have you ever initiated or organised such a
protest yourself?
27. Do you think that the Party branch should actively en-
gage itself in the organisational process of a village elec-
tion?
28. Do you think that if the village director is elected by the
villagers, the Party secretary should also be elected by
them? Or do you think that this is not important or not
good?
29. We have learned that there is a broad discussion going
on in China that direct elections should be extended to
the township level. What do you think about this?
Addi tional
30. Do you think that it is more or less efficient if the posts
of Party secretary and village director are assumed by
one person? Or do you think that they should be held
by two different persons?
27N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
